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1. Introduction 
Radio frequency identification (RFID), based on the MIT Auto-ID project [1], is a technology 
that uses wireless transmission to identify an object. RFID is seeing increased use in various 
industries as an alternative to the bar code. An RFID system consists of three components: 
the reader, the tag, and the back-end database. Some advantages of an RFID system are that 
it does not require direct contact with the tag, and can scan multiple tags simultaneously. 
However, because the reader uses wireless technology to communicate with the tag and the 
EPC Class 1 Gen 2 protocol [2] does not have a well-designed access mechanism to protect 
the tag data privacy and location privacy, a malicious attacker is able to retrieve the tag’s 
information by listening to the traffic between the reader and the tag [3]. To protect the 
information stored on a tag, Juels [5] and Weis [6] proposed methods for a tag to lock or 
destroy itself when attacked. However, these methods are an inconvenience to normal users.  
Many studies [7] propose authentication mechanisms in RFID systems, in which only 
authorized readers can read the correct information storing on the tag. However, due to 
hardware limitations, an RFID tag cannot perform complex operations, such as traditional 
symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms. 
Previous research proposes using the simple XOR operation to encrypt messages in RFID 
authentication protocols. Some studies use the RFID tag’s built-in CRC function to achieve 
message authentication [8]. Other studies [4][9][10][11] use the one-way hash function to 
enhance authentication protocol security. This study briefly explains these authentication 
mechanisms and analyzes existing security issues. 
Karthikeyan [12] proposed a mutual authentication scheme that uses two matrices and the 
corresponding anti-matrix. In this approach, the multiplication of a vector key and the 
matrix serves as an authentication index for the tag. However, in Karthikeyan’s scheme, the 
tag does not verify reader’s return value; that is, the attacker can re-send the message to 
track tag’s location. 
Duc [8] used the built-in CRC function of an RFID tag to generate a message authentication 
code (MAC) consisting of a random number and a secret previously shared between the tag 
and the reader. Duc uses the MAC to authenticate the tag and update the pre-shared secret. 
However, Duc’s scheme cannot prevent the forge attack and it does not have forward 
security. To enhance Karthikeyan and Duc’s scheme, Chien [13] proposed a synchronization 
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authentication protocol based on CRC. However, because CRC is a linear function, no 
protocols based on CRC can resist the forge attack.  
Other studies use a one-way hash function in the RFID authentication mechanism 
[4][9][10][11][14]. Henrici proposed a hash based scheme [9] in which the tag sends h(ID) 
instead of its unique ID to the reader. Henrici’s scheme protects the tag’s location privacy 
because the attacker cannot derive the tag’s ID from h(ID). 
In Henrici’s scheme, if the message between reader and tag is lost, the tag will be out-of-
sync. To improve Henrici’s scheme, Yang proposed a novel mutual authentication 
mechanism [10] that uses index-pseudonyms and XOR method. In this case, the tag 
generates a hash value for a random number sent by the reader. This hash value is used as 
the tag’s pseudonym. In Yang’s protocol, an attacker can trace the tag’s location because the 
current authentication message sent from tag to the reader can be derived from the last 
authentication message. 
Ohkubo proposed an authentication scheme that uses the hash chain technique to renew the 
secret information stored in the tag [4]. The tag’s ID is derived from two hash functions, G 
and H. However, in Ohkubo’s scheme, the database must perform an exhaustive search to 
find the matching tag ID, which creates a computing burden in the database. Further, 
Ohkubo’s scheme cannot avoid replay attacks. 
Chan [3] proposed an authentication scheme that uses the Chameleon Hash algorithm to 
update the tag’s ID and protect the tag’s location privacy. In Chen’s algorithm, the database 
uses the authentication information from the previous session to derive the tag’s current ID, 
which means an exhaustive search of the database is not required. Lee [16] proposed an 
authentication scheme based on a hash function to protect communication between the tag 
and the reader. In this approach, the tag’s ID is updated concurrently in the database and 
the tag. Lee’s scheme is resistant to replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks, and 
provides location privacy. 
Other studies discuss how to embed the RFID reader into a mobile phone, which then serves 
as a mobile RFID reader [18][19]. In the mobile RFID environment, any user that holds a 
mobile RFID reader can retrieve any tag’s information. As a result, RFID security problems 
become even more serious in the Mobile RFID environment [20]. 
In the Mobile RFID environment, a mobile RFID reader is able to move freely and read any 
tags nearby. The database must determine the reader’s identity before providing it with tag 
information. Therefore, authentication schemes must be modified to accommodate this 
feature. For example, in Lee’s and Chan’s schemes, the reader forwards the authentication 
message between the database and the tag, and the database always trusts the reader. In the 
Mobile RFID environment, however, the reader cannot be trusted, and the communication 
channel between the reader and the database is not secure [3][16].   
This paper proposes an authentication mechanism based on the COMP-128 algorithm 
[21][22], called COMP-128 in Mobile RFID Authentication Protocol (C-MRAP), for use in 
Mobile RFID environments. C-MRAP uses the A3 algorithm in COMP-128 to encrypt 
messages, and uses the A8 algorithm in COMP-128 to update the authentication key and 
session key between the database and the tag. In C-MRAP, the database, the mobile reader, 
and the tag authenticate each other, and the transmission messages between them are 
encrypted to provide robust security.  
This paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses related studies. The third 
section presents the C-MRAP algorithm. The fourth section performs security analysis and 
performance analysis, while the fifth section draws conclusions. 
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2. Related works 
The previous section briefly discusses some RFID authentication protocols and their security 
issues. This section describes the Mobile RFID architecture, the authentication protocols 
used in Chan [3] and Lee [16], and the COMP-128 algorithm used in the current GSM 
architecture. 
2.1 Mobile RFID architecture 
Figure 1 illustrates the typical Mobile RFID environment, in which each user can read the 
product information of RFID tags through a combination of mobile phone and RFID reader 
devices. For example, a consumer using a mobile phone's RFID reader can read the tag on a 
movie poster, and then link to the RFID database to download movie-related information 
and release dates, and reserve tickets online. 
In Figure 1, the communication between the authentication server (AS) and back-end 
database is secure. But the channel between the tag and the mobile reader, and the channel 
between the mobile reader and the database are insecure.  
The operations of a Mobile RFID system are as follows: 
1. The mobile reader sends a request to the tag. The tag generates a message containing 
the authentication message, and sends it to the reader. The reader then forwards the 
message to the authentication server to validate the tag’s identity. 
2. If the tag is valid, the authentication server sends the key updated messages through 
the reader to the tag. 
3. The tag replies with a successful update message through the reader to the 
authentication server. 
4. The authentication server sends the tag’s information to the reader as soon as it receives 
the acknowledgement message from the reader. 
5. The reader connects to the back-end database through the AS to get extra services, e.g., 
booking a ticket. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The Mobile RFID architecture 
2.2 Chan’s protocol 
Chan [3] proposed an RFID authentication protocol based on the Chameleon hash algorithm 
[26]. A chameleon hash function is associated with a pair of public and private keys. A user 
R generates a key pair, a public key HKR and a private key CKR, according to a given 
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generation function. The chameleon hash functon, denoted CHR(m1,r1), can be computed 
easily by using R’s public key HKR, where m1 and r1 are two strings. The chameleon hash 
function has two important properties: collision resistant and trapdoor collisions. For two 
messages m1 and m2, where m1 ≠ m2, it’s hard to find a collision that CHR(m1,r1) = CHR(m2,r2) 
by using R’s public key HKR (the collision resistant property). However, it is easily to find a 
collision that CHR(m1,r1) = CHR(m2,r2) by using R’s private key CKR (the trapdoor collisions 
property). 
Table 1 shows the terminology of Chan’s protocol. The database and every tags shares five 
variables: a unique serial number CID, a transaction counter TID, the last transaction 
counter LST, and two random numbers SN1, and SN2. The TID increases in each transaction, 
and the LST will be set to the current TID  if the authentication procedure is done 
successfully. 
 
CID Tag’s identification 
TID The transaction counter of a tag 
LST The previous TID that authenticated successfully 
SN1, SN2 Random numbers 
REF A pointer stored i-1th authentication data 
Table 1. Terminology of Chan’s protocol 
Figure 2 shows Chan’s protocol. When a reader sends a read request to a tag, the tag 
generates three random numbers, r1, r2, and r3, and sends them to the reader (step 1). The 
reader forwards them to the database (step 2). The database uses the trapdoor property of 
Chameleon hash to calculate r4 that satisfy CHR(r1,r2) = CHR(r3,r4).  Database sends r4 to the 
tag (step 3). The tag checks if CHR(r1,r2) = CHR(r3,r4). The tag then performs the following 
operations: 
1. Increases TIDi by 1. 
2. Calculates ΔTID=TIDi-LSTi-1 
3. Generates three chameleon hash values: Ki=CHR(r1,r2), HIDi-1=CHR(CIDi-1,SN2), and 
CHR(CIDi-1, TIDi-1).  
4. Uses A5/1 algorithm [21] to encrypts the two variables (HIDi-1||Δ TID) and CHR(CIDi-1, 
TIDi-1) by the key Ki to construct M1=EKi((HIDi-1||Δ TID)|| CHR(CIDi-1, TIDi-1)). 
5. Sends M1 to the database (step 4).  
After the database receives M1, the database uses Ki to decrypt the message and gets  
(HIDi-1||Δ TID) and CHR(CIDi-1, TIDi-1). Because the database does not know tag’s identity, 
it searches HID by calculating CHR(CID, SN2) for all tags. If there is a match, the database 
performs the following operations: 
1. Updates TIDi = HIDi-1||Δ TID 
2. Verifies CHR(CIDi-1, TIDi-1) 
3. Calculates M2= CHR(TIDi-1,CIDi-1).  
4. Sends M2 to the tag (step 5). 
When the tags receives M2, it verifies whether M2= CHR(TID,CID). Finally, both the database 
and the tag update CIDi and LSTi. 
In a transaction of Chan’s protocol, a tag should do six Chameleon hash operations and one 
A5 encryption. The database should do 2n+5 Chameleon hash operations, one A5 
decryption, and a collision finding of Chameleon hash. 
www.intechopen.com




Fig. 2. Chan’s Protocol 
2.3 Lee’s protocol 
Lee proposed another RFID authentication protocol by using one-way hash function [16]. In 
Lee’s protocol, the database and every tags shares four variables: a unique serial number 
CID, a transaction counter TID, the last transaction counter LST, and a random number SN. 
The TID increases in each transaction, and the LST will be set to the current TID  if the 
authentication procedure is done successfully. 
Figure 3 shows Lee’s protocol. When a reader sends a read request to a tag, the tag performs 
the following operations: 
1. Generates a random number N.  
2. Increases TID by 1.  
3. Calculates ΔTID=TIDi-LSTi-1. 
4. Calculates the hash value of CIDi-1, where HIDi-1=H(CIDi-1).  
5. Calculates another three hash values: H(SN⊕ HIDi-1⊕N), H(SN⊕N), and H(CIDi-1⊕TIDi-
1).  
6. Constructs M1 = N||H(SN⊕ HIDi-1⊕N)|| ΔTID⊕H(SN⊕N)||H(CIDi-1⊕TIDi-1), and 
sends M1 to the database through the reader (step 2). 
The database performs the following operations: 
1. Searches SN  by H(SN⊕ HID⊕N) 
2. Checks if the condition LST+ΔTID > TIDi-1 holds 
3. Updates TIDi = LST+ΔTID 
4. Verifies the tag’s identity by checking H(CIDi-1⊕TIDi-1) 
5. Generates a random number R and updates HID, CID, TID and LST in the database if 
the tag is valid. 
6. Constructs M2= R⊕H(SN⊕ (N+1))|| H(R⊕CIDi-1⊕ TIDi-1), and sends M2 to the tag (step 
3). 
The tag then verifies H(R⊕CIDi-1⊕ TIDi-1) by using R. If the value is correct, the tag updates 
CIDi and LSTi: CIDi=H(R⊕CIDi-1) and LSTi=TID. 
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Fig. 3. Lee’s protocol 
2.4 COMP-128 algorithm 
The GSM authentication architecture uses the A3 algorithm of COMP-128 for authentication, 
the A8 algorithm for generating session keys, and the A5 algorithm for encryption. Table 2 
shows the components used by the COMP-128 algorithm in the GSM network.  
 
MS (Mobile station) The mobile phone 
SIM(Subscriber Identity Module) 
The smartcard put into the mobile phone, to 
store the session key and perform simple 
operations 
AuC (Authenticaton center) The AuC authenticates each SIM card 
BS(Base station) 
The station communicates with the mobile 
phone 
Ki The key used for authenticatoin 
Table 2. COMP-128 Terminology 
In the GSM network, each mobile station shares a key Ki with the authentication center. A 
malicious attacker cannot get the Ki by sniffing all the packets in the air. Figure 4 shows the 
operation flow of the COMP-128 algorithms (A3, A5, and A8). 
When the AuC wants to authenticate a SIM card in a mobile station, it generates a 128-bit 
random number (RAND) and delivers it to the MS through the BS. The MS then forwards 
the random number to the SIM card module. The SIM module computes SRES = A3(Ki, 
RAND). The SIM module forwards SRES to the AuC to authenticate itself. If the SRES is 
correct, both the AuC and SIM module generate a session key Kc = A8(Ki, RAND), which is 
used to encrypt all the messages between the MS and the BS. 
3. COMP-128 in Mobile RFID Authentication Protocol (C-MRAP) 
To improve Lee and Chan’s schemes, this paper proposes a mutual authentication scheme, 
called the COMP-128 in Mobile RFID Authentication Protocol (C-MRAP), for the Mobile 
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Fig. 4. COMP-128 Algorithms 
RFID environment. There are three phases in the C-MRAP protocol. In the first phase, the 
database authenticates the mobile reader and the tag. The reader queries the tag and then 
sends a read request to the database by forwarding the tag’s identity message. The database 
uses the session key shared with the reader to authenticate the reader’s identity. The 
database then uses the information sent from the tag to verify the tag’s identity. In the 
second phase, the database updates the authentication key with the tag after the database 
successfully authenticates the tag. The third phase is used to confirm the key update. The 
tag sends an update confirmation message to the database, and the database then sends the 
tag’s information to the reader. Table 3 shows the information stored in the database, the 
reader, and the tag. In this approach, the tag shares four secrets with the database: SN, Kci, 
UN, and PIN. These variables are used to authenticate the tag and to perform key update. 
Table 4 lists the terminology used in C-MRAP scheme. 
 
Shared information between the database and the tag 
SN The unique serial number of the tag. 
PIN The access password of the tag. 
Kci The key used to authenticate the tag in the ith round.  
UN A parameter used in the key update process  
Shared information between the database and the reader 
RID The unique serial number of the reader. 
The extra information stored in the database 
Kci-1 The key used in the i-1 round.  
Nr, Nt 
Random numbers generated by the reader and the tag in the 
previous authentication message. They are used to foil replay attacks. 
DATAx The detailed information of a tagx 
Table 3. The variables stored in the database, the reader, and the tag 
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r1 r2 The random numbers generated by the reader. 
r3 The random number generated by the database. 
N The random number generated by the tag. 
Kci The tag’s authentication key used in the ith round  
Auth The tag’s authentication information, which is derived 
from the A8 algorithm. The database uses this variable to 
search for the tag in its memory. 
M1 The message generated by the tag. 
M2 The message generated by the database. 
m1 || m2 The message combines m1 and m2. 
A3(m1,m2) Encrypt m1 and m2 using the A3 algorithm 
A8(m1,m2) Encrypt m1 and m2 using the A8 algorithm 
f(.) The pseudo random number generator 
H() A one-way hash function 
CertRID Reader’s certificate 
Table 4. C-MRAP terminology 
3.1 The C-MRAP protocol 
Figure 5 depicts the C-MRAP protocol, which includes three phases. The following section 
describes each message in detail. 
 
 
Fig. 5. The C-MRAP protocol 
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Phase 1: Tag authentication 
In the first phase, the reader and the database exchange their own certificates and establish a 
shared session key Kbr. When the reader sends a read request to the tag, the tag sends the 
authenticated messages to the reader. The reader then forwards the message and two 
random numbers shared with the database to the database. The database searches its 
records to verify if the tag is valid. 
1. When a reader sends a read request to a tag, the reader first generates two random 
numbers r1 and r2,, and encrypts them using the session key Kbr shared by the reader 
and the database. The reader then sends the encrypted values to the database.  
2. When the database receives the request, it generates another random number r3, 
encrypts it with Kbr, and sends the encrypted value back to the reader. 
3. The reader calculates req=r1⊕r3, and sends req to the tag.  
4. When the tag receives req, the tag generates a random number n, and calculates two 
variables: Auth = SN⊕Kci and M1=A3(req⊕n, Auth) The tag then forwards M1 and n to 
the reader. 
5. The reader combines r3, n, and M1, encrypts it with the session key Kbr, and sends the 
encrypted message to the database.  
6. The database decrypts the message using the session key Kbr. The database perform an 
exhaustive search of all the tags by calculating M1’=A3(r⊕n , SN⊕Kci). If there is a 
matched M1, the database uses the A3 algorithm to calculate M2=A3(r2⊕Kci , PIN), 
encrypts M2 with Kbr, and sends it to the reader.  
Furthermore, the database calculates Kci+1=A8(Kci , UN), and backs up the Kci to Kci-1, 
and Kci+1 to the Kci, as Figure 6 shows. If the database cannot find a matching tag, the 
database searches its records by calculating Auth’=A8(SN , Kci-1) and M1’=A3(r⊕n , 
Auth’). If a match is found, the database and the tag are out of sync. At this time, the 
database checks req and n with the random variables Nr and Nt. If the variables are not 
the same, the database updates the tag’s key because it is not a replayed message. 
Phase 2: Synchronized Key Update 
The reader decrypts M2, and sends M2 and r2 to the tag. 
The tag computes M2’=A3(r2⊕Kci , PIN), and compares it with M2. If they are equal, the 
authentication process is complete. The tag generates its new key by calculating Kci+1= 
A8(Kci , UN). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Key Update 
Phase 3: Key Update confirm 
The tag calculates RES = A3(Kci , f(SN)) and sends it back to the reader. 
The reader encrypts RES using the session key Kbr, and sends the encrypted message to the 
database. 
www.intechopen.com
 Radio Frequency Identification Fundamentals and Applications, Bringing Research to Practice 
 
192 
The database compares RES with A3(Kci , f(SN)). If the value is correct, the database sends 
the tag’s information to the reader. 
Using secrets shared between the database, the reader, and the tag, the proposed protocol 
updates the tag’s authentication key during each session to protect the tag’s privacy in a 
mobile RFID environment. Because Kci is not transmitted on the air, the protocol is secure 
and the reader can rapidly obtain a tag’s information from the database.  
4. Security analysis and performance evaluation  
This section analyzes all the transmitted messages in the proposed protocol, and explains 
why this protocol is resistant to security attacks and can continue its operations without 
falling out of sync. Possible attacks include packet sniffing attacks, replay attacks, the man-
in-the-middle attacks, and message dropping attacks. This section also compares the 
proposed protocol with other methods.  
Section 4.2 implement three algorithms, including the Chameleon hash, COMP-128, and SHA1 
algorithms, and evaluates the performance of Chan’s, Lee’s, and the proposed protocols. 
Results show that our protocol decreases the computation time of a tag and the database. 
4.1 Security analysis 
Message sniffing attacks 
Assume a malicious attacker collects message 3 (req), message 4 (M1 , n), message 7 (M2 , r2), 
or message 8 (RES) which are sent between the reader and the tag, and attempts to perform 
a guessing attack to retrieve tag information. The attacker cannot succeed in this attempt 
because he cannot guess the Auth value after obtaining req and n in message 3 and 4 because 
Auth = SN⊕Kci, and the SN and Kci are only known by the database and the tag. The attacker 
must perform a brute force attack to guess these two values. Because Kci is updated in every 
session, it is hard to guess both SN and Kci at the same time. In addition, the attacker cannot 
retrieve messages transfered between the database and the reader because these messages 
are encrypted by the session key Kbr.  
Replay attacks 
Using several random numbers, an attacker can attempt to replay message 3 (req) and 
message 7 (M2, r2). However, this is not possible because the messages are different in each 
session. For example, an attacker cannot replay message 5 (EKbr(r3 || n || M1)) because the 
database will verify it with the previous req’ and n’. 
Message dropping attacks 
Next, consider the situation if the authentication message between the reader and the tag is 
lost during the transmission. In the proposed protocol, if message 3, message 4, or message 7 
is lost, the reader waits for a timeout period and performs another reading request.  
Man-in-the-middle attacks 
If an attacker plays a role between the tag and the reader, and attempts to modify the value 
of req or n, the authentication process will fail because the req value is generated from the 
original reader, and not by an attacker.  
If an attacker collects message 3 and message 4, and attempts to generate a new message 5 
and send it to the database, this attack will fail because the attacker does not know r1 and r3.  
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If an attacker attempts to modify message 7 (M2 , r2), or message 8 (RES), the attack will fail 
because the attacker does not know the value of PIN and Kci. 
Data privacy 
The previous analysis indicates that an attacker cannot retrieve any valid information from 
data transmissions between the reader and the tag. In this protocol, only the variable n is not 
encrypted. Furthermore, all the transmission messages between the database and the reader 
are protected by the session key Ekbr. 
Location privacy 
An attacker can trace a tag’s location if he can send the tag a specified value, and the tag 
returns a predicted value to the attacker. This type of attack will fail because the value of 
message 4 (n and M1) changes every time. If an attacker wants to trace the tag by re-sending 
message 7, he will fail because the Kci is different. 
Forward security 
The proposed protocol satisfies the forward security because the COMP-128 algorithms it 
uses are one-way functions. Thus, an attacker cannot derive the previous messages using 
current messages.  


















X X X X X X 
Duc [8]  O O X X X X 
Chien [13]  O O O X O X 
Henrici [9]  X X X X X X 
Yang [10]  X X O O X X 
Ohkubo [4]  O O X X O X 
Chan [3]  O O O X O X 
Lee [16]  O O O X O X 
Our scheme O O O O O O 
Table 5. The Security Analysis 
According to Table 5, Karthikeyan and Henrici’s protocols cannot protect the location 
privacy, and are not resistant to replay attacks or middleman attacks. Chien’s protocol 
cannot resist replay attacks because it uses the CRC function. Yang’s protocol is resistant to 
replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks but it cannot protect the location privacy [15]. 
Chen and Lee’s protocols are not suitable for mobile RFID environments because they trust 
all readers. Our protocol performs mutual authentication between the tag, the reader and 
the database, and is therefore suitable for use in mobile RFID environments. 
4.2 Performance evaluation  
In the Ohkubo protocol [4], the database must perform an exhaustive search to retrieve tag 
information. If there are n tags, the database complexity is O(mn) after m operations. The 
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database complexity of Lee, Chan, and our protocol are the same, which is O(n). However, 
Chan’s scheme executes many Chameleon hash operations in the database and the tag, 
which decreasing overall performance. 
Table 6 and Table 7 compare the operations of the three protocols. These tables assumes that 
the database is operated on a P4-2GHz personal computer, and the reader is a PDA 
equipped with a StrongARM SA-110 32-bit 233MHz CPU. We also assume that the CPU 
inside the tag is a 8-bit 12MHz processor. Table 6 lists all the operations required by the 
three protocols. In Chan and Lee’s protocols, the reader only forwards messages between 
the tag and the database. We assume the packets transmitted between the reader and the 
database are encrypted by AES algorithms. Table 7 lists the average processing times for the 
tag and the reader to perform a single transaction in various approaches.  
Table 8 lists the average execution times that it takes the database to search for a tag and 
perform key updates. Table 7 shows that the proposed protocol has better performance than 
Chan’s scheme. Lee’s scheme offers better performance than our protocol, but in Lee’s 
scheme, the reader is trusted, rendering this scheme unsuitable for a mobile RFID 
environment. In the mobile RFID environment, the identity of a mobile reader must be 
authenticated to ensure protocol security. Finally, the proposed protocol provides better 
protection than Lee or Chan’s protocols. 
 
Protocols Database operations Reader operations Tag operations 
Chan 
2n*CHR search + 5*CHR + 
1*collision + 2*AES 
encrypt + 3*AES decrypt 




2n*SHA1 search + 3*SHA1 
+ 1*AES encrypt + 1*AES 
decrypt 




2n*COMP-128 search + 
4*COMP-128+ 3*AES 
encrypt + 3*AES decrypt 
3*AES encrypt + 
3*AES decrypt 
4*COMP-128 
Table 6. The operations required by the three protocols 
 
Protocol Tag execution time Reader execution time 
Chan 0.0034 0.000945 
Lee 0.0001 0.00047 
Our scheme 0.0004 0.00141 
Table 7. A comparison of execution times  
(Unit: second) 
 
Protocols 100 tags 1000 tags 10000 tags 100000 tags 
Chan 0.0300 0.2368 2.1127 24.4873 
Lee 0.0008 0.0064 0.0552 0.6451 
Our scheme 0.0053 0.0420 0.3725 4.4791 
Table 8. The average database execution times for various schemes 
(Unit: second) 
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Mobile RFID technology offers more advantages than traditional RFID. However, because 
mobile RFID technology uses wireless communication, a secure authentication protocol is 
required to protect user privacy.  
The proposed protocol is resistant to forge tag attacks, man-in-the-middleman attacks, 
packet sniffing attacks, replay attacks, packet dropping attacks, and out-of-sync attacks. In 
addition, the shared private key stored in the tag and the database is updated after each 
successful transaction. Compared to other protocols, this method provides a more secure 
protocol that enables all users to use a more secure Mobile RFID environment. 
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